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ABSTRACT 
 
A Framework for Defending against Prefix Hijack Attacks. (May 2009) 
Krishna Chaitanya Tadi, B.E., Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Narasimha Reddy 
 
 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) prefix hijacking is a serious problem in the 
Internet today. Although there are several services being offered to detect a prefix hijack, 
there has been little work done to prevent a hijack or to continue providing network 
service during a prefix hijack attack.  
This thesis proposes a novel framework to provide defense against prefix 
hijacking which can be offered as a service by Content Distribution Networks and large 
Internet Service Providers. Our experiments revealed that the hijack success rate reduced 
from 90.36% to 30.53% at Tier 2, 84.65% to 10.98% at Tier 3 and 82.45% to 8.39% at 
Tier 4 using Autonomous Systems (ASs) of Akamai as Hijack Prevention Service 
Provider. We also observed that 70% of the data captured by Hijack Prevention Service 
Provider (HPSP) can be routed back to Victim. However if we use tunneling, i.e. trying 
to route data to neighbors of Victims which in turn sends the traffic to Victims, we 
observed that data can  be routed to Victim 98.09% of the time. Also, the cost of such 
redirection is minimal, since the average increase in path length was observed to be 2.07 
AS hops.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 A prefix hijack involves a hijacker announcing IP prefixes that it does not own 
into the global routing system. It is a serious security threat in the Internet today. 
Potentially, a prefix hijack can be launched from any part of the Internet and can target 
any prefix belonging to any network because Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is 
the major inter domain routing protocol used in Internet, is completely insecure and uses 
no authentication mechanism. There have been several prefix hijack incidents reported 
in recent years and they are on the rise. There are several flavors of prefix hijacking such 
as exact prefix hijack, sub prefix hijack and interception. In both exact prefix and sub 
prefix hijacks, data is blackholed / dropped at the hijacker. In an interception based 
attack, hijacker routes the data to the victim after eavesdropping on the information. 
Such interception based attacks are both difficult to achieve and detect. Attackers hijack 
IP addresses for the purpose of conducting malicious activities such as spamming and 
Denial of Service (DoS) without worrying about their identity getting disclosed. 
Sometimes the attackers want to disrupt the reachability to legitimate hosts or spoof 
them. Such hijacked IP prefixes were also found to be sold on eBay [1]. Imagine typing 
www.citibank.com in your browser, which in turn sends/fetches information from the 
machines belonging to hijacker instead of authentic Citi bank machines.  
 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure 
Computing. 
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There are several tools currently available to detect a prefix hijack. Such 
detection usually involves monitoring changes in the origin Autonomous System set for 
a given prefix. However the response to thwart such hijack is mostly through NANOG 
mailing lists or contacting the administrators of hijacking Autonomous System. 
Considerable time is wasted in such process during which the stability and security of 
Internet is severely disrupted. If administrators of hijacking Autonomous System fail to 
cooperate, such hijacking can continue for long periods of time. We propose a 
mechanism which wastes no time in restricting the hijack and ensures reachability to the 
authentic prefix owner without any manual intervention. 
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CHAPTER II 
BGP ROUTING 
The internet is a vast collection of networks that interact with each other using 
the TCP/IP protocol suite. Routing protocols are responsible for determining the 
connectivity in the Internet and for generating routing tables that direct packets to their 
destinations. Thus routing protocols provide connectivity between every pair of routers 
in the Internet.  This poses a huge scalability challenge with the explosive growth of 
Internet. The Autonomous System (AS) structure introduces a two level hierarchy that 
decomposes the problem of determining Internet connectivity into two parts [2]:  
(i) Intra Domain Routing: Routing within the AS. 
(ii) Inter Domain Routing: Routing between ASs. 
An AS is defined by Wikipedia [3] as a collection of connected IP routing prefixes under 
the control of one or more network operators that presents a common, clearly defined 
routing policy to the Internet. In other words, AS is one network or set of networks 
under a single administrative control. An AS might be the set of all computer networks 
owned by a company, or a college. Companies or organizations might sometimes own 
multiple ASs. In such cases, each of them is managed independently. A good example is 
UUNet, which owns one AS for domestic networks (AS 701) and another for 
International networks (AS 702).  
The AS numbers are allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIR), which in turn, assigns them to the 
customers. The low level routing i.e. Intra domain routing is handled by Interior 
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Gateway Protocols such as Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and Open Shortest Path 
First (OSPF). At higher level, Exterior Gateway Protocol such as BGP determines AS 
connectivity or Inter domain routing. Also Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR) 
allows BGP routers to advertise aggregated addresses that reduce the amount of global 
routing information that needs to be exchanged [2]. 
 
Figure 1. Inter Domain Versus Intra Domain Routing 
 
 
 In Figure 1, AS 1 is a national ISP with two routers R1 and R2, AS 2 and AS 3 
are regional ISPs with Routers R3 and R4 respectively. The routing between R1 and R2 
is governed by Intra domain routing policies where as routing between R1/R2 and R3, 
R1/R2 and R4 is governed by Inter domain routing such as BGP. Usually when BGP is 
used between Autonomous Systems, the protocol is referred to as External BGP 
(EBGP), if the service provider is using BGP to exchange routes within an AS it is 
referred to as IBGP (Interior BGP). 
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Figure 2. Typical BGP Routing Table 
 
Figure 2 shows some entries in the BGP routing table obtained from RouteViews 
for IP addresses of AS 3794 which belongs to Texas A&M University. The attributes 
listed in the Figure 2 are elaborated below [4]: 
Network:  This is the destination IP address to which the packet must be delivered. 
Next Hop: This attribute is the IP address that is used to reach the destination router. 
Metric:  This is also referred to as Multi Exit discriminator. In Figure 3, Router C is 
advertising the route 172.16.1.0 with a metric of 10, while Route D is advertising 
172.16.1.0 with a metric of 5. The lower value of the metric is preferred, so AS 100 will 
select the route to router D for network 172.16.1.0/24 in AS 200 [4]. 
Local Preference: This attribute is used to choose a suitable exit point from the AS. In 
Figure 4, Router A belonging to AS 100 receives advertisement for network 
172.16.1.0/24 and it sets the Local Preference to 50. Similarly Router B belonging to AS 
100 receives the advertisement for 172.16.1.0/24 and it sets the Local Preference to 100. 
These values will be exchanged between Routers A and B, because Router B has higher  
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Figure 3.  BGP Metric Attribute [4] 
 
 
Figure 4.  BGP Local Preference Attribute [4] 
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Local Preference value, it will be used as an exit point to reach network 172.16.1.0/24 
while sending data from AS 100 to AS 200. 
Weight: This is a Cisco defined proprietary attribute that is local to the router. If the 
router learns about more than one route to a destination, the route with the highest 
weight will be preferred. 
Path:  BGP is a path vector routing protocol. BGP advertises the sequence of AS 
numbers to reach a destination. In Figure 5, AS D is the owner of the prefix set PD say 
165.91.0.0/16. AS D announces this information to its neighboring routers B and C. 
Now B propagates the information obtained from D to its other neighboring routers A 
and C by appending itself to the route. Thus C receives the following information [Path 
B, D: Destination 165.91.0.0/16] from B and [Path D: Destination 165.91.0.0/16] from 
D. Now AS C can either choose the path through B to reach D or directly route 
information to D. The decision depends on the business relationship between 
Autonomous Systems which is discussed in detail later. If we assume, for now, that path 
length is the deciding factor, AS C will directly try to route information to D instead of 
routing it through B. Now C propagates this information to its neighboring routers B and 
A. B would stick to its original route i.e. directly route traffic to D instead of routing it 
through C which leads to longer path length. Now A receives the following BGP updates 
from B [Path B, D: Destination 165.91.0.0/16] and C [Path C, D: Destination 
165.91.0.0/16]. Since both paths have the same length (assuming length here refers to 
number of hops), it can arbitrarily choose the path or the administrator of AS A can 
create rules/attributes to choose the path appropriately. However, in the real world, such 
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routing based on path length is rarely true. The business relationship between two 
connected ASs plays a major role in determining what traffic is routed on a link. 
 
 
Figure 5. BGP Path Vector Routing 
 
 The Business Relationships/Contractual Agreements between the Autonomous 
Systems are usually classified into the following categories [5].  
Customer – Provider: In this scenario, the customer AS pays the provider AS for routing 
its traffic to the rest of the world. Thus a provider can transit traffic to a customer, but 
the customer cannot transit traffic between its providers. This is explained in Figure 6. 
P1 and P2 are the provider ASs of AS C. Thus P1 can route traffic to C or P2 can route 
traffic to C, but P1 cannot route traffic to P2 via C, because C would end up paying both 
P1 and P2 for data exchanged between P1 and P2. This is also called the valley free 
property of Internet. 
 
Figure 6. Illustrating Customer Provider Relationship 
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Peer – Peer: In this, there is usually no monetary flow involved. Two peers exchange 
traffic between their respective customers.  A peer does not act as transit for exchanging 
data between two other Peers. In Figure 7, P1 is the provider of AS 1, C1 is the customer 
of AS 1. AS 1 - AS 2 and AS 1 – AS 3 are peers. Now if AS 2 wants to send data to C1, 
it can send it through AS 1 since C1 is a customer of AS 1. However AS 1 cannot act as 
transit for traffic between AS2 – P1 and AS2 – AS3. 
 
Figure 7. Illustrating Peer - Peer Relationship 
 
Sibling: This refers to link between ASs of the same organization. 
 The properties described above can be summarized as follows. If an Origin AS 
can reach a destination AS using a Provider, Peer and a Customer AS, it chooses 
Customer AS to route its traffic. If the Origin AS has to decide between a Provider and a 
Peer, it chooses the Peer AS. In other words, the order of preference is Customer > Peer 
> Provider. A destination AS is on a Customer (Peer, or Provider) route from origin AS, 
if the first non sibling edge on the route from Origin AS is a Provider – Customer (Peer 
– Peer, or Customer – Provider) edge. Also, if an AS receives updates for the same 
prefix from multiple ASs at the same level, say multiple customers, it then decides based 
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on the path length i.e. it chooses the AS with the least number of hops. Although the 
administrators of ASs may chose different policies, [6] verifies that the above described 
no-valley prefer-customer policy is followed in most of the ASs since it makes more 
commercial sense. 
 There is no publicly available information about inter AS relationships. Internet 
registries such as American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) only provide 
information about who administers an AS. The authors of [5] have proposed an 
algorithm which classifies the relationships with 99% accuracy. More than 90.5% of AS 
pairs in the Internet have customer-provider relationship, less than 1.5% of AS pairs 
have sibling relationships and less than 8% of AS pairs have peer relationships. 
Traffic Engineering in Autonomous Systems: An AS with more than one 
provider is called a multihomed AS.  Motivated by the need to improve network 
resilience and performance, increased number of enterprise and campus networks are 
connecting through multiple providers [7]. These multihomed ASs, therefore, must 
undertake the task of engineering the traffic flowing in and out of the network through 
these multiple links using different inter-AS traffic engineering approaches. ASPP (AS 
path prepending) is a popular method to achieve such objectives. Prepending here means 
an AS path that has duplicated AS numbers that appear consecutively. The BGP routing 
table in Figure 2 shows such paths. Consider the traffic from AS 1 to AS 4 in Figure 8. 
AS 1 receives two routes for prefixes in AS 4 i.e. (AS2, AS4) and (AS3, AS4). 
Assuming same local preference, AS 1 can route data either through AS 2 or through AS 
3 since the path length is also same for both the cases. If AS 4 wishes that traffic from 
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AS 1 go through the link AS 2 −AS 4, it can use ASPP and announce AS path (AS 3, AS 
4, AS 4) to AS 1. Now AS 1 receives two routes with AS path (AS 2, AS 4) and (AS 3, 
AS 4, AS 4). Therefore, the router in AS1 would choose the first route. 
 
Figure 8. Path Prepending Illustration 
 
There are several other approaches [8], [9] apart from AS path prepending to 
perform traffic engineering. These techniques are mainly used for Load Balancing, Cost 
Minimization, Performance Optimization, and Backup Routes [7]. Sometimes these 
approaches are also used for detecting and preventing prefix hijacks. 
AS Hierarchy: ASs with large customer cones have an important role in the Internet 
structure. At the top of the hierarchy are ISPs known as Tier-1 ISPs. A Tier-1 AS is an 
AS with no providers and Peers with all Tier-1 ASs [10]. Hence they are at the top of the 
Internet routing hierarchy. Table 1 shows networks that are believed to be Tier 1 by 
Wikipedia [11] and CAIDA [12]. Because of no formal definition or body that 
determines Tier-1 ASs, the term is often misused for marketing purposes. The list of ASs 
in Table 1 is an approximate estimate and cannot be guaranteed to be 100% accurate. 
Tier 2 networks are “regional aggregators”, they collect traffic from Tier 3 sites and, if 
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they cannot satisfy them directly, they pass it on to Tier 1 sites. In other words, Tier 2 
acts as transit between Tier 3 and Tier 1. Most of the ISPs are located in Tier 3. An AS 
connected to only provider ASs is called a stub. Stub ASs are located at the bottom of 
the AS hierarchy. More details about the BGP protocol/standards can be found in RFC 
4271 [13]. 
 
Table 1. Tier 1 Networks 
 
AS Number 
AS Information 
ISP Name Country 
AS 1239 Sprint US 
AS 701 UUNET Technologies US 
AS 7018 AT&T US 
AS 3356 Level 3 US 
AS 209 QWEST US 
AS 174 Cogent Communication US 
AS 3549 Global Crossing US 
AS 3561 Savvis US 
AS 2914 NTT Communication JP 
 
 
 
Content Distribution Networks (CDN):  We used the largest CDN, Akamai for the 
purpose of analyzing our proposed prefix hijack prevention scheme. CDNs such as 
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Akamai (http://www.akamai.com) attempt to improve web performance by delivering 
content to end users from multiple, geographically dispersed servers located at the edge 
of the network [14]. Most CDNs have their ASs in points of presence of major ISPs so 
that requests can be forwarded to topologically proximate replicas. Thus they serve as 
excellent points to implement our prefix hijack prevention framework. 
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CHAPTER III 
PREFIX HIJACKING 
We already know that an AS announces IP prefixes belonging to its customers. A 
prefix hijack occurs when an AS announces prefixes that it does not own. From here on, 
we will refer to such AS as Hijacker and the AS to which the prefix originally belongs to 
will be referred to as a victim. In Figure 9 [6], assume AS 6 wrongly announces the 
prefix that belongs to AS 1. AS 5 previously routed through AS 3 to reach AS 1. On 
receiving a customer route through AS 6, it prefers the customer route over the Peer 
route and hence believes the false route. Thus, in this example of prefix hijack, AS 6 
announces prefix that it does not own and deceives AS 5. 
 
 
Figure 9. Illustrating Prefix Hijack 
  
Currently there is no authentication mechanism in BGP. Any AS can claim to be 
the owner of any prefix in the Internet. Taking advantage of this weakness is the 
fundamental mechanism for constructing prefix hijack attacks [15]. The Internet Routing 
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Registries such as ARIN maintain databases of prefix ownership, however, the contents 
are not maintained up to date and hence are not reliable. The attacks where the hijacker 
announces the same prefix as that of a victim is referred as an exact prefix hijack. 
Another type of hijack called sub prefix hijack involves an AS announcing a more 
specific prefix. Say the hijacker announces a /24 prefix, when the true origin announces 
a /16 prefix. In this case, BGP will treat them as different prefixes and will maintain 
separate entries for them in the routing tables. Due to the longest prefix matching rule, 
data destined to prefixes in the /24 range will be routed to the Hijacker AS. One might 
argue that since both Victim AS and Hijacker AS are claiming to be the owners of the 
same prefix, we can find multiple entries with the same prefix but different origins (once 
with Victim as the origin, another one with hijacker as the origin) in the routing table. 
Can such multiple origin ASs (MOAS) be used as a signature to detect prefix hijacking? 
The answer is unfortunately NO.   The authors of [16], [17] show MOAS prefix can be 
legitimately announced by multiple origin ASs.  Also, hijacker AS can cleverly avoid 
MOAS anomaly by announcing an AS with an invalid next hop. Assume AS X is the 
victim which advertises to sender AS S. The path at AS S would be [AS S, …, AS X]. 
Now in an invalid next hop attack, hijacker AS Y sends advertisement such that AS S 
will see the path as [AS S, …, AS Y, AS X]. Thus, the origin will remain the same i.e. 
AS X, making it difficult to detect. However, because of the increased path length, such 
attacks usually have low impact.  
 Based on how the hijacker treats the hijacked traffic, prefix hijacks can be 
classified into following categories: 
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(i) Blackholing: The attacker simply drops the attracted packets, i.e. packets 
destined to victim address prefix. 
(ii) Interception: The attacker forwards the hijacked traffic to the Victim after 
eavesdropping on the information in the packets. 
Usually Interception is hard to detect and can last a long period of time before being 
detected. The consequences of Blackholing can be online phishing, spam emails [18] 
and DDos attack. Interception on the other hand is much more dangerous and at the 
same time hard to achieve.  
Hijack Analysis: Here we discuss all the scenarios occurring in a prefix hijack. The rules 
obtained here are the basis for the simulation experiments we did to test our hijack 
prevention framework.  
Scenario 1: Existing route is a Customer route, invalid route from the hijacker is a 
Customer Route. Since both Hijacker and Victim are on the Customer Path, path length 
is the deciding factor. If the path to hijacker is shorter, hijack succeeds. However, if the 
path to the Victim is shorter, hijack fails. If both have the same path length, the routing 
policy attributes such as weight and Local Preference decide the route. In our simulation 
analysis, the decision is made randomly. 
Scenario 2: Existing route is a Customer route, invalid route from the hijacker is a Peer 
route. Since ASs give higher preference to advertisements from Customer routes 
compared to Peer routes, the hijack fails. 
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Scenario 3: Existing route is a Customer route, invalid route from the hijacker is a 
Provider route. Since ASs give higher preference to advertisements from Customer 
routes compared to Provider routes, the hijack fails. 
Scenario 4: Existing route is a Peer route, invalid route from the hijacker is a Customer 
route. Since ASs give higher preference to Customer routes compared to Peer routes, the 
hijack succeeds. 
Scenario 5: Existing route is a Peer route, invalid route from the hijacker is also a Peer 
route. Since both the Hijacker and the Victim are on the same Peer path, path length is 
the deciding factor. If the path to the hijacker is shorter, hijack succeeds. However, if the 
path to the Victim is shorter, the hijack fails. If both have the same path length, the 
routing policy attributes such as weight and Local Preference decide the route. In our 
simulation analysis, the decision is again made randomly. 
Scenario 6: Existing route is a Peer route, invalid route from the hijacker is a Provider 
route. Since ASs give higher preference to Peer routes compared to Provider routes, the 
hijack fails. 
Scenario 7: Existing route is a Provider route, invalid route from the hijacker is a 
Customer route. Since ASs give higher preference to Customer routes compared to 
Provider routes, the hijack succeeds. 
Scenario 8: Existing route is a Provider route, invalid route from the hijacker is a Peer 
route. Since ASs give higher preference to Peer routes compared to Provider routes, the 
hijack succeeds. 
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Scenario 9: Existing route is a Provider route, invalid route from the hijacker is also a 
Provider route. Since both Hijacker and Victim are on the same Provider path, path 
length is the deciding factor. If the path to the hijacker is shorter, the hijack succeeds. 
However, if the path to the Victim is shorter, the hijack fails. If both have the same path 
length, the routing policy attributes such as weight and Local Preference decide the 
route. In our simulation analysis, the decision is again made randomly.  
 Table 2 summarizes all the scenarios for prefix hijack analysis. In this table we 
assume the path length to the Victim, i.e., existing path length is always „n‟. 
Interception Analysis: In order to intercept traffic, the hijacking AS should reroute the 
captured traffic to the Victim. It can do so by forwarding the traffic along its existing 
valid route to the Victim. None of the ASs in this route should choose the invalid 
advertisement sent by the hijacker. If they do, traffic loops back to the Hijacker before 
reaching the victim. The authors of [10] have done a detailed analysis of Interception 
techniques based on the no-valley, prefer-customer policies discussed earlier. Since our 
framework concentrates on hijacking, we don‟t elaborate Interception techniques here. A 
summary of interception analysis from [10] states that an AS trying to intercept traffic to 
Victim prefix p can advertise the invalid route to all its neighbors unless its existing 
route for p to Victim AS is through a provider, in which case, the invalid route should 
not be advertised to other providers of the AS. 
The authors of [6] perform analysis on Resilience and Impact of Autonomous 
Systems in prefix hijacking. Resilience is defined as the defensive power of a node in 
hijack, where as Impact measures the attacking power of an AS. It was observed that 
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Resilience and Impact are directly proportional i.e. a node with high resilience during 
hijack can also cause major impact during an attack. Figure 10 indicates the 
Resilience/Impact of nodes in different Tiers. 
 
Table 2. Prefix Hijack Analysis 
 Invalid Route Customer Peer Provider 
Existing 
Route 
Length    
 
Customer 
<n Hijack Fails Hijack Fails Hijack Fails 
=n Random  Hijack Fails Hijack Fails 
>n Hijack Succeeds Hijack Fails Hijack Fails 
 
Peer 
<n Hijack Succeeds Hijack Fails Hijack Fails 
=n Hijack Succeeds Random Hijack Fails 
>n Hijack Succeeds Hijack Succeeds Hijack Fails 
 
Provider 
<n Hijack Succeeds Hijack Succeeds Hijack Fails 
=n Hijack Succeeds Hijack Succeeds Random 
>n Hijack Succeeds Hijack Succeeds Hijack 
Succeeds 
 
 
Historically, it was believed that Tier 1 nodes are the most resilient nodes, but 
now it came to light that it is the well connected Tier 2 nodes with highest 
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impact/resilience. Akamai with its heavy presence in Tier 2, or major ISP‟s such as 
AT&T with large AS presence in Tier 2 networks can cause high impact in the case of a 
hijack. This is one of the major reasons to choose Akamai and AT&T for analyzing our 
framework. 
 
Figure 10. Resilience/Impact of Nodes in Different Tiers [6] 
 
Our prefix hijack threat model assumes the following: 
(i) An attacker can hijack TCP connection between peers. 
(ii) An attacker can modify updates, delay or delete them. 
(iii) An attacker can get access/control to a BGP router and generate false 
advertisements of prefixes that it does not own or generate non authentic 
updates. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PREFIX HIJACK INCIDENTS CASE STUDY 
There have been several incidents of prefix hijacking due to router 
misconfiguration. RIPE [19] reports an incident involving prefix hijacking of YouTube 
on 24 February 2008. AS 36561 (Authentic AS) announces prefix 208.65.152.0/22 
belonging to YouTube. Pakistan Telecom (AS 17557) which was trying to block 
YouTube in its own country claimed as the owner of 208.65.153.0/24.  Since PT 
announced a more specific prefix, due to the way BGP is organized, majority of the ASs 
chose PT instead of original YouTube AS to route data. Most of the customers of 
YouTube started receiving “Server not found” error. YouTube realized this and started 
announcing 2 prefixes: 208.65.152.0/22, 208.65.153.0/24 (longer prefix).  This lead to 
decrease in impact and YouTube started receiving some traffic. After sometime, 
YouTube started announcing more specific prefixes 208.65.153.128/25, 208.65.153.0/25 
as well which further decreased the hijack impact. By this time, PT realized its mistake 
and used AS prepending to further reduce the hijack impact, and after sometime it 
withdrew its false announcement. The key points to take from this incident are: 
Announcing the hijacked route only mitigates the problem but does not solve it. There is 
some delay before YouTube could realize prefix hijacking on its domain. Our proposed 
model on the other hand reacts quickly and announces the same prefix from multiple 
ASs distributed around the world reducing the hijack impact to minimal.  It also raises 
an important question, in case of hijack, can‟t we announce a more specific prefix and 
reclaim traffic?  The answer is NO. Most ISPs block prefixes longer than /24 because it 
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leads to explosive growth in the routing tables. Figure 11 indicates the scenarios before 
and after the hijack of YouTube prefix. 
On 25 April 1997, a misconfigured router maintained by a small service provider 
in Virginia injected incorrect routing information into the global Internet and claimed to 
have optimal connectivity to all Internet destinations. Because such statements were not 
validated in any way, they were widely accepted. As a result, most Internet traffic was 
routed to this small ISP. The traffic overwhelmed the misconfigured router and other 
intermediate routers, and effectively crippled the Internet for almost two hours [20]. 
Malicious prefix deaggregation can allow adversaries to take over a prefix by 
advertising a more specific prefix block. An example occurred in 1997, when 
misconfigured routers in the Florida Internet Exchange (AS7007) deaggregated every 
prefix in their routing table and started advertising the first /24 block of each of these 
prefixes as their own. A /24 block is the smallest prefix generally allowed to be 
advertised by BGP, and because of its specificity, routers trying to reach those addresses 
would choose the small /24 blocks first. This caused backbone networks throughout 
North America and Europe to crash, as AS 7007 was overwhelmed by a crush of traffic 
and the routes it advertised started flapping [20]. This was not a malicious attack, but an 
error made by the network operator. 
The authors of [6] report more such incidents. On Jan 22, 2006, AS-27506 
belonging to RCN New York Communications announced a number of prefixes that did 
not belong to it. Almost 40 prefixes belonging to 22 unique ASs were hijacked. In 
another incident, AS 9121 falsely announced routes to over 100,000 prefixes on 
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December 24, 2004. AS 174 (Cogent) hijacked a prefix (64.233.161.0/24) belonging to 
AS 15169 (Google) on May 07, 2005. All prefix hijack events are frequently reported in 
the NANOG [21] mailing list. 
 
Figure 11. YouTube Hijack Incident [20] 
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CHAPTER V 
RELATED WORK ON PREFIX HIJACK DETECTION AND PREVENTION 
The authors of [22] propose a Prefix Hijack Alert System (PHAS).  All the prefix 
owners who are interested in using their service register with the PHAS server and 
provide contact email addresses. PHAS uses BGP monitor data from RIPE [23] and 
Route Views [24] to maintain current origin set for each registered prefix. A change in 
this origin set triggers an origin event, which in turn translates to a notification message 
to the prefix owner. To control origin events for prefixes with frequent origin changes, a 
time-window based mechanism is used. This adaptive window based scheme is central 
to ensure that the system scales from the perspective of origin set monitoring and limits 
the number of false positives. In addition, there is a local notification filter that 
administrators can fine tune according to the properties of their AS to further reduce 
false positives.  In fact, RIPE operates an online service MyASN [25] which notifies the 
network operators when their prefix is announced with an incorrect AS path. It is based 
on similar principles as that of PHAS. 
 The authors of [26] propose a protocol enhancement which enables BGP to 
detect bogus route announcements from false origins. They propose to create a list of 
multiple ASs who are entitled to originate a particular IP address prefix, and then attach 
this list to the route announcements by all the originating ASs of this prefix. The BGP 
community attribute [27] provides a simple way of attaching the MOAS list to a route 
announcement. The community is a BGP attribute of variable length. It can be used to 
convey additional information to the global routing system for a group of prefixes that 
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share some common properties. BGP routers that receive the route announcements from 
multiple origins can verify that the MOAS is intentional and valid. If another AS makes 
a faulty route announcement of a prefix p, BGP routers which have received the right 
route to this prefix p can easily detect the fault since the faulty route‟s origin AS will not 
be in p‟s MOAS list. In Figure 12, prefix p is multihomed and is originated by AS 1 and 
AS 2. A MOAS list is attached to the routing enhancements indicating that both AS 1 
and AS 2 can serve as origin ASs for this prefix. Hijacker AS 4 also originates a route to 
prefix p, but AS 4 does not appear in the MOAS list announced by AS 1 and AS 2 
indicating ongoing prefix hijack. This scheme will only help to detect hijack but does not 
give information about who the hijacker is. In the above example, it can be either AS 4 
or AS1, AS2. Also schemes that require BGP protocol changes at massive levels have 
failed when it comes to practical implementation. MOAS list also adds to the ever 
increasing overall size of the routing table and route announcements. 
 
Figure 12. MOAS List Enhancement to BGP Protocol 
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 The authors of [15] present a detection scheme based on the following 
observations. When a prefix is not hijacked: 
(i) The hop count of the path from a source to prefix is generally stable. 
(ii) The path from a source to this prefix is almost always a super path of the path 
from the same source to a reference point along the previous path, as long as the 
reference point is topologically close to the prefix. 
By carefully selecting multiple vantage points and monitoring from these points 
for any departure from the above listed observations, one can detect a hijack.  
Cryptographic based solutions S-BGP [28], SoBGP [29] requiring public key 
infrastructures for the entire IP address space and AS number space to certify if an AS 
has the authority to advertise a prefix have been proposed. Such solutions although 
necessary are hard to be implemented and require universal adoption. 
  The authors of [30] propose a prefix hijack mitigation system. They preselect 
several ASs and call them lifesaver ASs. In case of a hijack, a detection system notifies 
these lifesaver ASs with information about the hijacker AS, Victim AS and the victim 
prefix. All the lifesaver ASs attempt to purge bogus routes originating from hijacker and 
promote victim routes by reducing path length in AS_SET.  
 The authors of [31] propose a detection system based on prefix owner‟s view of 
reachability. The system is based on the fact that during prefix hijack, large percentages 
of ASs in the Internet are polluted, and hence, probes (such as ping) initiated from 
victim‟s network are expected to witness unreachability to large number of ASs. In other 
words, unreachability to large number of ASs is used as a signature of a prefix hijack.  
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 From the current literature, we came to a conclusion that there have been several 
methods proposed to detect prefix hijack, but very few proposed to prevent a hijack. The 
ones proposed to prevent hijack are very complex and require global adoption of several 
BGP protocol changes. Such solutions don‟t appeal to ISPs because of complexity and 
overhead. Our proposed framework on the other hand requires no changes at all and can 
be offered as a paid service making it commercially an attractive and implementable 
solution. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 
MODEL 
 The goal of our proposed framework is to provide safety against prefix hijack as 
a service from CDNs such as Akamai or major ISPs such as AT&T with significant 
presence of ASs in Tier 2 and are well connected. The summary of our goals include: 
 Provide Hijack Prevention as a commercial service. 
 No infrastructure upgrade required. 
 Mitigate an ongoing hijack. 
 Not effecting the routing of prefixes in other ASs. 
Figure 13 shows an idealistic view of high level Internet topology. It ignores 
multihoming and cross connections between customer cones. 
 
Figure 13. High Level View of Internet Topology 
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In Figure 13, AS 1, 2 and 3 are Tier 1 ASs and the cones represent their 
respective customer base. We call the ASs used to implement hijack prevention service 
as HPSP (Hijack Prevention Service Provider) ASs. These are marked as circles. 
Diamond represents the Victim AS and Square represents the hijacker AS. In the above 
scenario, hijacker AS announces a prefix owned by victim AS. HPSP gets its input from 
any of the several Hijack detection schemes discussed in the previous chapter. Once the 
HPSP knows the prefix being hijacked, it advertises the same prefix, in other words 
HPSP claims to be the owner of the hijacked prefix. Since ASs give preference to 
advertisements from customers, all Tier 1 ASs i.e. AS 1, 2, and 3 believe in HPSP 
because HPSPs are usually concentrated in Tier 2 and are direct customers of multiple 
Tier 1 ASs. Now, if any sender in the customer cone of AS 1 or AS 3 tries to send the 
data to hijacked prefix, it ends up either in the victim or in the HPSP which in turn routes 
it back to the victim. Thus the impact of hijacker is throttled. In this idealistic scenario, 
as long as the hijacker and the sender are in different customer cones and HPSP has 
presence near all Tier 1 networks, the data will always be sent to Victim or HPSP. We 
assumed that there are 9 Tier 1 ASs in chapter I. There are around 60,000 ASs. 
Assuming a uniform distribution, each cone has 6666 ASs. 
A sender and hijacker can be chosen in 
(9*6666)
C2 ways i.e. 1799610021. 
Scenarios where the hijacker and sender belong to the same customer cone = 9*(
6666
C2) 
= 199930005 
Thus the probability of Hijack success = (199930005)/( 1799610021) = 11.1%. 
However in reality, the scenario is different. There will be cross cone links, distances of 
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hijacker and sender from Tier 1 and the routing policies of ASs all play an important 
role. 
 In all our experiments, we assume there is a strong hijack detection scheme that 
feeds hijack related data to HPSP in real time. Going forward, we try to answer two 
important questions: 
(i) In case of a hijack, what is the traffic distribution to the Hijacker (ASs that 
modify their route by believing the hijacker) and to the Victim (ASs that continue 
to route to the Victim) without HPSP service? Also, what is the traffic 
distribution to the Hijacker, the Victim and the HPSP AS with active HPSP 
service? 
(ii) How many times can we route the data from the HPSP to the victim? 
SIMULATION SETUP 
 For answering the first question, we used the BGP Routing Information Base 
(RIB) data from Route Views [24].  Route Views currently collects BGP routing table 
data from 30 Peers around the world. We can peek into AS level connectivity from these 
30 peers mostly distributed in Tier 1 and Tier 2. The raw data obtained has several 
duplicates, incomplete paths that need to be cleaned.  The StraightenRV [32] script 
available from CAIDA does this. StraightenRV massages a Route Views table for 
further processing. In addition, it produces a number of files containing statistics, and a 
'full' version of the RV table. The full RV table is a standard, easy-to-parse version of the 
RV table. The .as file contains the following counts for each AS: origin, transit, peer and 
degree. The origin count of an AS is the number of times the AS appears in the origin 
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(last) position of AS paths. The peer count of an AS is the number of times the AS 
appears in the peer (first) position of AS paths longer than one.  The transit count of an 
AS is the number of times an AS appears in a transit (any but first or last) position of AS 
paths. Once we obtain this data, we need to derive relationships between the ASs. For 
this we use the Gao‟s [5] heuristic algorithm. It is based on the valley free property of 
the Internet. Valley-free property states that: 
(i) A provider-to-customer edge can be followed by only provider-to-customer.  
(ii) A peer-to-peer edge can be followed by only provider-to-customer edges. 
The heuristic algorithm goes through the AS path of each routing table entry. It 
finds the highest degree AS and lets the AS be the top provider of the AS path. Here 
degree refers to the number of neighboring ASs. Knowing the top provider, we can infer 
that consecutive AS pairs before the top provider are Customer to Provider, and 
consecutive AS pairs after the top provider are Provider to Customer edges. If two pairs 
of nodes have been classified as both Customer – Provider and Provider – Customer, we 
convert their relationship to siblings.  We ignore siblings for most of our analysis since 
they constitute approximately 1% of the total links. Now, we need to identify peering 
relationships. If an AS pair appears consecutively in the AS path and neither of the AS 
pair is the top provider of the AS path, then the AS pair has a transit relationship and 
cannot be peers.  An AS path has at most one consecutive AS pair that has a peering 
relationship. That is, a top provider can have a peering relationship with at most one of 
its neighbors in the AS path. Also, AS pairs that peer have comparable degree. All the 
facts stated above are used to identify peer relationships. 
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RESULTS 
 We first built the basic AS topology and identified the business relationships 
between each neighboring AS pairs. Since the hijack success rate increases as we move 
to the top of the AS hierarchy, we analyzed the distribution of ASs at various levels. 
Figure 14 illustrates the distribution of ASs with respect to average distance from a Tier 
1 AS. We measured the path length of an AS to all well known Tier 1 ASs, averaged it 
and rounded it off to the nearest integer. Although this may not be the exact 
classification to distribute ASs into Tiers we chose this approach since there are no 
formal rules for classification of ASs into Tiers. From here on, Tier X AS refers to an 
AS whose average path length is X-1 from all Tier 1 ASs. The AS distribution data 
indicated that most of the ASs are located at Tier 3 (41.08%), 4 (36.22%) and 5 
(13.81%). Thus ASs from these tiers account for 91.11% of the total ASs. 
 
 
Figure 14. AS Distribution at Different Tiers 
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To measure hijack success rates, we used Route View monitors as information 
sources i.e. senders. The hijackers and victims were randomly chosen. Initially, we chose 
a hijacker at Tier 2. One of the Route View monitors acted as the Sender. Victim was 
chosen at different tiers. We repeated the experiment now with different senders in the 
Route View set. The entire process is repeated again for different hijackers in the Tier 2 
and the data are averaged. If there were X experiments in total and if it was observed 
that Y (Y<= X) times the data was routed to the hijacker, then the hijack success rate is 
defined as: 
Hijack Success rate at Tier 2 = (Y/X)*100. 
Now this hijack success rate is measured at different Tiers. Figure 15 gives the pseudo 
code of the algorithm described. 
Figure 16 shows the Hijack Success Rate at different Tiers without any Hijack 
Prevention Service Provider (HPSP). We observe that hijack is successful 90.36% of the 
time if launched from a hijacker in Tier 2, 84.65% if launched from a hijacker in Tier 3, 
82.45% of the time if launched from a hijacker in Tier 4, 79.85% of the time if launched 
from a hijacker in Tier 5. Thus we conclude that the impact of hijack is severe without 
any hijack prevention/mitigation mechanism.  
Now, we repeat the experiment with a HPSP. The pseudo code in Figure 15 still 
applies, but now in Step 20, we carry out hijack analysis with H (Hijacker), V (Victim), 
RV (Route View monitor/Sender) and HPSPs (Hijack Prevention Service Providers). 
Also in Step 22, hijack succeeded if Victim gets the data, but now hijack succeeds if 
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either victim or HPSP gets the data. The routing of data from HPSP to victim is analyzed 
later.  
 
1. X=2, Total_Experiments = 0, Hijack_Success = 0, Count = 10. 
2. Choose a Unique Random Hijacker H in Tier X. 
3. Count-- 
4. If Count = 0 
5.       Count = 10 
6.       X = X + 1 
7.       If X > 5 
8.             Print Total_Experiments, Hijack_Success 
9.             End Program 
10.       EndIf 
11.       Go to Step 2 
12. EndIf 
13. If all RV monitors have been selected as Senders 
14.       Go to Step 2 
15. Else 
16.       Select a Route View monitor RV. 
17. EndIf 
18. For Y = 2 to 5 
19.       Choose a Victim V in Tier Y. 
20.       Carry out hijack analysis with H, RV and V. 
21.       Total_Experiments++ 
22.       If Hijack Succeeds 
23.             Hijack_Success++ 
24.       EndIf 
25. EndFor 
 
Figure 15. Pseudo Code to Measure Hijack Success Rate 
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Figure 16. Hijack Success Rate without HPSP 
 
 Ideally HPSP ASs should be located in Tier 2, with strong connectivity to Tier 1 
and Peer Tier 2 ASs. CDN‟s such as Akamai and large ISPs such as AT&T fall into this 
category. Akamai has around 22 ASs distributed mainly in Tier 2, Tier 3 and Tier 4. 
Figure 17 indicates the results of Hijack success rates with Akamai as HPSP.  We 
observe the hijack is successful 30.53% of the time if carried from a Tier 2 hijacker, 
10.98% of the time if launched from a Tier 3 hijacker, 8.39% of the time if launched 
from a Tier 4 hijacker, and 2.66% of the time if launched from a Tier 5 hijacker. In 
conclusion, we can say that the hijack success rates reduced significantly by using 
HPSPs. Figure 18 indicates the results of Hijack success rates with AT&T as the HPSP. 
The results are similar to that observed with Akamai. We observe the hijack is successful 
33.96% of the time if carried from a Tier 2 hijacker, 6.69% of the time if launched from 
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a Tier 3 hijacker, 10.68% of the time if launched from a Tier 4 hijacker, and 9.5% of the 
time if launched from a Tier 5 hijacker. 
 
 
Figure 17. Hijack Success Rate with AKAMAI as HPSP 
 
 
Figure 18. Hijack Success Rate with AT&T as HPSP 
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 In Figure 19, we compare all the hijack experiments. We can conclude clearly 
that using HPSP reduces the hijack success rate drastically. Also Figure 19 shows results 
with both Akamai and AT&T acting as HPSPs. For such a scenario, we observe the 
hijack is successful 24.3% of the time if carried from a Tier 2 hijacker, 5.62% of the 
time if launched from a Tier 3 hijacker, 2.96% of the time if launched from a Tier 4 
hijacker, and 2.2% of the time if launched from a Tier 5 hijacker. Assuming a hijacker 
can originate with equal probability from any AS, we take the distribution of ASs in Tier 
2, 3, 4 and 5 into account and combine with the hijack success results and calculate 
Weighted Hijack Success Rate. 
WHSR = 

5
2Tier
 (Hijack Success Rate in Tier * Average AS distribution in Tier) 
 
Figure 19. Comparing All the Hijack Experiments 
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Figure 20. Weighted Hijack Success Rates for Different HPSPs 
 
Figure 20 gives the WHSR figures for all the experiments. WHSR drops from 
71% to 8.8% by using an HPSP, and from 8.8% to 4% using multiple HPSPs. 
 We studied if there exists any correlation between the geographic locations of 
HPSP ASs to the geographic locations of data originators/source to guide the placement 
of Hijack Prevention Service Provider ASs. We choose Akamai as HPSP for this 
experiment. The results are illustrated in Table 3. RV refers to Route View node or data 
originator, A refers to AKAMAI node i.e. HPSP. ASi refers to Asia, EU refers to Europe 
and US refers to United States. A value of 36 for (RV(US), A(US)) indicates that in 36 
hijack events the data from a Route View AS node in US ended up at AKAMAI AS in 
US. From the data we found that geographic location does not have a strong impact on 
the traffic that it attracts. For example most of the data originated at US, ASi ended up at 
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EU AKAMAI node. We attribute this result to Akamai AS node 20940 located in 
Germany which is well connected with Peer ASs located in US and ASi. 
 
Table 3. Correlating Geographic Locations of HPSP ASs with That of Data 
Originators/Source 
Data Originator, Destination AS Hijack Events 
RV(US), A(US) 36 
RV(EU), A(EU) 43 
RV(ASi), A(ASi) 0 
RV(US), A(EU) 40 
RV(US), A(ASi) 0 
RV(EU), A(US) 11 
RV(EU), A(ASi) 0 
RV(ASi), A(US) 5 
RV(ASi), A(EU) 32 
 
 
 To prove that well connected ASs at Tier 2 do a good job as hijack defender, we 
did two experiments with ATT ASs. In the first experiment we chose only 6 ATT ASs 
that have strong peer network at Tier 2 and that are directly connected with multiple Tier 
1 ASs. The hijack success rates were observed to be 36.77%, 10.34%, 7.4% at Tier 2, 
Tier 3 and Tier 4 respectively. We repeated the experiment with all the 122 ATT ASs 
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providing the service, which included the 6 ATT ASs in the first experiment. The 
success rates were observed to be 33.96%, 6.69% and 10.68% respectively at Tier 2, 
Tier 3 and Tier 4 respectively. The results are compared in figure 21. Thus, we don‟t see 
much difference in hijack success rates even though we increased the ASs providing the 
service from 6 to 122.  From this we can deduce that, ASs that are customers of multiple 
Tier 1 ASs and have a strong peer network at Tier 2 are the ideal choice for providing 
the proposed hijack defense service. 
 We also did an analysis on which Akamai ASs i.e. HPSPs captured the hijacked 
data and results are illustrated in Figure 22 (X axis indicates hijack simulation events, Y 
axis indicates ASs. A long horizontal bar indicates that AS was able to capture data from 
several hijack simulation events). Although all the 22 Akamai ASs are announcing the 
prefix, only 4 ASs (12222 in USA, 20940 in Germany, 34164 in London, 21342 in Asia) 
are successful in capturing the data most of the time. This can cause a problem because, 
if a single HPSP AS is overwhelmed with traffic, it might lead to congestion near this 
AS. To prevent this, we experimented by increasing the path lengths for ASs 12222 and 
20940 which capture most of the traffic using Route Aggregation  which can be 
implemented without any changes to the BGP protocol. This, however, leads to increase 
in hijack success rate which is illustrated with an example in Figures 23 and 24. Figure 
23 indicates a network topology where A refers to HPSP node, RV is the route view 
node which originates traffic, H is the hijacker node trying to capture traffic. T is a 
transit node. A is on a customer path for RV node, and so do H and T. H is also on a 
customer path for T. During Route aggregation, node A tries to append itself to the path 
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before sending the BGP update to RV node. If A appends itself 3 times, A appears to be 
3 hops away for RV node as shown in Figure 24. Thus RV would send the traffic to 
Hijacker instead of AKAMAI. 
 
 
Figure 21. Comparing HSR between 6 (Well connected) ATT ASs and 122 ATT ASs 
 
We experimented with several combinations and finally found that increasing the 
path length for AS 12222 by 1 and that of AS 20940 by 2 yields best traffic distribution 
with minimal increase in hijack success rate. The traffic distribution results after Route 
Aggregation are shown in Figure 26. The effect of Route aggregation on Hijack Success 
Rate is indicated in Figure 25. As expected the Hijack Success Rate (HSR) rates go up. 
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Figure 22. Traffic Distribution in HPSP ASs 
 
 
                                 
Figure 23. Normal Topology                       Figure 24. Topology with Route Aggregation 
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Figure 25. Effect on HSR due to Route Aggregation for Better Traffic Distribution  
 
 
Figure 26. Traffic Distribution after Route Aggregation 
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ROUTING DATA FROM HPSP TO VICTIM 
 Once the HPSP captures the data, it needs to route it back to the Victim or the 
authentic owner of the prefix. In other words, HPSP is now trying to intercept the 
Victim‟s data. This is shown in Figure 27. The circles which represent HPSP ASs should 
route the captured data back to the Victim. However, sometimes, it might happen that all 
the neighboring ASs of HPSP are corrupted by HPSP/Hijacker ASs and thus HPSP can‟t 
route data to Victim. From Victims point of view, such traffic, which is captured by 
HPSP but can‟t be routed to the Victim, is equivalent to Hijacked traffic thus increasing 
HSR. 
 
 
Figure 27. HPSP Trying to Route the Data Back to Victim 
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  For all the simulations till now, we used the data from Route Views. Since we 
always chose Route View monitors as sources of information, we had path information 
from sender to victim, sender to HPSP, sender to Hijacker to carry out hijack analysis. 
But now, we also need data about all possible paths from HPSPs to Victim and if any 
ASs in this path prefer Hijacker/HPSP instead of the Victim. For this, we constructed a 
strong AS level connectivity graph by combining the data from Route Views [24], RIPE 
[23]. Although the quality and accuracy of such AS maps is not 100%, it‟s a generally 
accepted notion that such BGP maps constructed from publicly available data are good 
enough for most BGP simulation experiments [33]. 
 Table 4 summarizes the results of our experiments with routing back the data 
from HPSP (in this experiment Akamai ASs) to the victim. For this, we randomly chose 
a Sender AS, a Hijacker and a Victim AS. Then we did an analysis on who will capture 
the data sent by the Sender AS. If HPSP wins, we retain the experiment results, else, we 
ignore the results of the experiment. We repeat this now by choosing a different Hijacker 
and a Victim AS. This process is repeated until we have 15 valid experiments in which 
HPSP wins. The entire process is again repeated with a different sender AS. Average 
Path Length in Column 3 indicates the average path length from sender to victim without 
any hijacker or HPSP AS. Column 4 lists the cases in which HPSP receives the data and 
can send it back to the Victim. Column 5 lists scenarios, where HPSP cannot send the 
data directly to Victim, thus uses the prefixes advertised by neighbors to tunnel the data 
to the victim. This requires victim ASs to have some partnership with neighbors so that 
the tunneled data can be routed back to the victim. Column 6 indicates scenarios where 
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data can neither be sent directly nor tunneled. This might occur because, the neighboring 
ASs of the Victim believe in advertisements from the Hijacker or the HPSP rather than 
the Victim. However, such instances are very rare. Column 7 indicates the new average 
path length because of routing data through the HPSP. 
 
Table 4. Analysis of Routing Back the Data from HPSP (Akamai) to Victim 
Sender 
AS 
Total 
Experime
nts (We 
ignore 
details of 
experime
nts in 
which 
HPSP 
fails to 
capture 
the data) 
Averag
e Path 
Length 
Experi
ments 
in 
which 
HPSP 
can 
send the 
data 
directly 
Exp.  in 
which 
HPSP 
can send 
data to its 
neighbor 
Exp.  in 
which 
HPSP 
cannot 
send the 
data 
Average path 
Length in 
Experiments 
where it can 
send the data 
(Sender -> 
HPSP + HPSP 
-> 
Victim/Neighb
or) 
AS18423 15 3.8 11 4 0 5.85 
AS29520 15 3.4 14 0 1 5.57 
AS3893 15 5.26 13 2 0 7.07 
AS16484 15 3.8 10 4 1 7.75 
AS6885 15 4.33 8 7 0 5.2 
AS22321 15 4.13 6 9 0 5.28 
AS1890 15 3.66 9 6 0 8.22 
AS11299 15 5.2 10 4 1 7.5 
AS18924 15 3.66 12 3 0 4.08 
AS31223 15 5.6 10 5 0 6.2 
AS22312 15 4 12 3 0 4.92 
AS2299 15 3.8 11 4 0 7 
AS5433 15 4.46 9 6 0 8.5 
AS42332 15 4.8 13 2 0 5.84 
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1. Total_Experiments = 0; HPSP_direct = 0; HPSP_indirect = 0; HPSP_nodata = 0,  
     Orig_avg_path_len =0; New_avg_path_len = 0; 
2.  Choose a sender AS. 
3.  While Total_Experiments <=15 
4.   Choose a random Hijacker AS and Victim AS. 
5.  Analyze advertisements received at Sender AS from Hijacker, Victim and HPSP 
   nodes. 
6.  If Hijacker/Victim wins the traffic from Sender 
7.   continue; 
8.  EndIf 
9.  Total_Experiments++; 
10.  Orig_avg_path_len = Orig_avg_path_len + (No. of hops from Sender to Victim) 
11.  Analyze advertisements at HPSP nodes to determine, if there exists a path to the 
   Victim node.   
12.  If path exists from any HPSP node to Victim 
13.   HPSP_direct++; 
14.   Choose shortest path from HPSP to Victim. (NOTE: We assume overlay  
   network HPSP Peers. Thus the HPSP node that receives or captures the  
   data may be different from HPSP node that sends data to Victim. This  
   reduces the path length/delay). 
15.   New_avg_path_len = New_avg_path_len + (Hops from Sender to HPSP)  
   +  (Hops from  HPSP to Victim) 
16.    Else 
17.              Get the neighbor ASs of Victim 
18.    Tunnel the data to neighbor of Victim using prefixes announced by the  
    neighboring AS. 
19.    If any neighboring AS can send data to Victim 
20.    HPSP_indirect++; 
21.    New_avg_path_len = New_avg_path_len + (Hops from Sender to  
    HPSP)  + (Hops from HPSP to neighbor) + 1 
22.   Else 
23.    HPSP_nodata++; 
24.   EndIf 
25.   EndIf 
26.  EndWhile 
27.  New_avg_path_len = New_avg_path_len / (HPSP_indirect); 
28.  Orig_avg_path_len = Orig_avg_path_len/(Total_Experiments); 
 
Figure 28. Pseudo Code to Route Data from HPSP to Victim 
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Table 5. Analysis of Routing Back the Data from HPSP (AT&T) to Victim 
Sender 
AS 
Total 
Experime
nts (We 
ignore 
details of 
experime
nts in 
which 
HPSP 
fails to 
capture 
the data) 
Averag
e Path 
Length 
Experi
ments 
in 
which 
HPSP 
can 
send the 
data 
directly 
Exp.  in 
which 
HPSP 
can send 
data to its 
neighbor 
Exp.  in 
which 
HPSP 
cannot 
send the 
data 
Average path 
Length in 
Experiments 
where it can 
send the data 
(Sender -> 
HPSP + HPSP 
-> 
Victim/Neighb
or) 
AS18423 15 3.62 12 3 0 4.84 
AS29520 15 5.4 14 1 0 6.22 
AS3893 15 4.66 9 6 0 6.8 
AS16484 15 3.62 13 2 1 5 
AS6885 15 5.4 9 6 0 5.8 
AS22321 15 4.00 8 6 1 4.6 
AS1890 15 6.26 9 6 0 6.8 
AS11299 15 5.6 14 1 0 6.2 
AS18924 15 5.89 13 2 0 6.84 
AS31223 15 6.5 14 1 0 7.6 
AS22312 15 4.7 11 4 0 6.54 
AS2299 15 5.34 15 0 0 6.75 
AS5433 15 5.4 10 5 0 5.8 
AS42332 15 3.8 13 2 0 5.2 
 
Figure 28 shows the pseudo code used to perform such an analysis. We observe 
that without tunneling we can route the data 70% of the time from the HPSP to the 
Victim. However, using tunneling, we can route the data 98.09% of the time. The cost of 
such redirection is an average increase in path length of 2.07 AS hops. Table 5 
summarizes the results of our experiments with routing the data from HPSP with AT&T 
as the HPSP, to the Victim. We observe that without tunneling we can route the data 
78% of the time from the HPSP to the Victim. However, using tunneling, we can route 
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the data 99.52% of the time. The cost of such redirection is an average increase in path 
length of 1.057 AS hops. Figure 29 summarizes the results of experiments on routing 
data from HPSP to the Victim. 
 
 
Figure 29. Summary of Routing Data from HPSP to Victim 
 
We conclude that the illustrated HPSP framework is highly successful in 
preventing prefix hijacks and can be fine tuned and better improved by carefully 
choosing locations of HPSP ASs. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 In this research, we proposed and evaluated a framework for Hijack Prevention. 
While the analysis involved routing tables from Route Views and RIPE, the simulation 
cannot be 100% accurate unless we have the routing tables from Akamai and AT&T 
whom we used as HPSP. We plan to further investigate on schemes to route data 
optimally from HPSP to the Victim so that the average increase in AS hops is minimal. 
We would also like to extend our analysis by choosing other Internet Service Providers 
as HPSPs.  Also, we would like to configure our scheme in Autonomous Systems to test 
real time performance. 
 BGP was designed in 1980‟s. It has definitely failed to address security issues in 
the current era. A transition to stronger and more secure Inter domain routing protocol is 
required. Such transition will require global cooperation among all Autonomous 
Systems. We believe our scheme can serve to mitigate prefix hijack attacks on BGP and 
act as insurance during hijack in this period of transition. 
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